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In New Mexico an outgoing wire transfer form was sent to the accounting center to process and send seller proceeds on a Tuesday. It never got there. Three days later the same wire transfer form was sent via email to the accounting center, but this time the form was altered and the wire amount more than doubled!

Somehow the initial outgoing wire transfer authorization was intercepted after it was processed by the accounting center. The following information had been altered:

  • Settlement date
  • Transaction date
  • Trust accounting date
  • Payee name
  • Amount
  • ABA routing number
  • Credit account name
  • Credit account number

The initial wire transfer sent on a Tuesday represented seller proceeds in the amount of $47,848.60. The fraudulent wire transfer sent on Friday was $105,075. The accounting center ran the outgoing wires report on that same Friday from their production system after releasing all the wires that day.

They compared the report total to the total shown on their wires bulletin board, which is done each day to make sure the totals match. The accounting center wants to ensure they have processed all posted wires for the day and that the escrow branches did not forget to transmit any outgoing wire forms, as they are busy.

That day, the amount of outgoing funds on the wires bulletin board exceeded the balance on the report. The $105,075 wire showed as processed on the wires bulletin board, but was never posted as a valid wire on the production system. They immediately tried to recall the wire only to discover the entire amount had already been drained by the account holder.

The accounting center contacted their state manager who in turn notified the team in the National Escrow Administration Department. The administrators located the account holder in Philadelphia and contacted him to return the money. He explained the funds were sent to him on behalf of his business partner.

When he originally went to the bank, the branch did not have enough cash on hand, so he only withdrew $50,000. He then drove to the next branch and withdrew the balance of $55,075. He supposedly turned the cash over to his business partner to pay entertainers for an event they were hosting over the weekend. He said he did not realize the money had been stolen and promised to contact his business partner to return the funds.

In the meantime, the Company contacted the Albuquerque Police Department, the Philadelphia Police Department and the Secret Service to report the theft. The Secret Service agent assigned to the case acted swiftly in hauling the bank account holder into his office for questioning. During the questioning, the bank account holder agreed to allow the officer to monitor a call to his business partner to plea for a return of the funds. On the call the partner admitted sending the stolen funds to Nigeria!

Although law enforcement and others are still pursuing the case, it is not likely the Company will recover the funds. We have filed a loss for the $105,075. Not only that, we had to notify the sellers their bank account information had been exposed to the crooks when we sent their proceeds via wire transfer. We agreed to provide them a year's worth of Credit Check Basic® through Experian® and notified them of the importance of closing their account at the bank.

 

 
 

MORAL OF THE STORY

The policy for any accounting center personnel initiating and approving wire transfers using online banking software, is to use designated terminals equipped with Citrix® to prevent someone from hacking into their workstation, miming their keystrokes and then accessing our trust accounts. These specially designated terminals prevent our Company from becoming a victim of cyber theft. The New Mexico accounting center is now using workstations equipped with Citrix®.

In addition, accounting centers will now balance their outgoing wires report to their wires bulletin board constantly throughout the day. They will verify every outgoing wire form posted by the escrow branches in the escrow production system, before initiating and releasing each outgoing wire.

They will also change the passwords to their generic email accounts where outgoing wire transfer forms are sent by the escrow branches to make sure they are keeping their emails secure.

 
 
 
 
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