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An escrow officer of a title company in Michigan received emailed wire transfer instructions from the listing agent on behalf of the seller. Five days later the escrow officer received another email from the listing agent stating the seller's bank account had been compromised and the wire should be re–directed to a credit union in Boston.

The email contained new wire transfer instructions. The escrow officer failed to notice the email address was slightly different than the agent's real email address. The escrow officer transmitted $96,449 to the bank account reflected on the emailed instructions.

The next day the listing agent called the escrow officer to inquire why the seller never received their proceeds. The escrow officer replied the wire was sent to the credit union as she instructed in her email. The listing agent confirmed she never sent wire instructions for a credit union.

The escrow officer panicked! She contacted the accounting center to recall the wire and reported the incident to the national escrow administrator. The national escrow administrator received the wire information from the escrow officer and noticed the account holder name was not the name of the seller. The escrow administrator obtained the credit union's account holder's contact information using an Internet search.

The national escrow administrator called the account holder and demanded the wire transfer in the amount of $96,449 be returned immediately. The account holder, a 61–year old widow residing in Boston, said the wire was sent legitimately on behalf of her boyfriend. She said her boyfriend sold some real estate in California and had the proceeds directed to her account, because his accounts were frozen.

The national escrow administrator asked the widow if she had ever met the boyfriend face–to–face. Her response was, "No, I met him online. He is out of the country, but we talk every night. He told me to withdraw the money and send it to him immediately through an international money transfer. He said he was going to use the money to come to Boston so we could be married."

After being advised of the transaction details and the diversion of the funds, the widow immediately went to her credit union and instead of sending the money to her boyfriend, she returned the proceeds to the title company that sent the wire.

At the same time, an escrow officer in Houston received an email from one of the sellers in her transaction. Without verifying the legitimacy of the email, the escrow officer sent a wire transfer in the amount of $80,879.

Later that same day, the seller entered the escrow branch and asked to pick up his check. The escrow officer responded that a wire transfer was sent to his account. The seller asked how she was able to obtain his banking information. She said she sent the wire to the account shown in his email. He said he never sent an email. The seller left the office without his proceeds and was clearly upset.

The escrow officer contacted the accounting center to put an immediate recall on the wire transfer. She then contacted the national escrow administration department with the details. The national escrow administrator reviewed the wire transfer information and confirmed the account holder name matched that of the seller in this transaction. Contacting the real account holder seemed impossible, since due to banking privacy laws the receiving bank would never turn over the account holder name without a court–issued subpoena.

Luckily, the escrow branch manager received a call from a woman claiming the title company had frozen her account and she desperately needed it unfrozen. The branch manager knew the caller was the account holder that had the diverted $80,879 wire transfer. She took down her name and number and turned it over to the national escrow administrator. The escrow administrator called the account holder who had her adult daughter with her. She put the phone on speaker so they both could inquire why the mom's account had been frozen at the bank.

The escrow administrator listened as the mother explained the funds had been sent to her for a sale conducted by her boyfriend and that she was obligated to withdraw the funds and send them to him overseas. The escrow administrator asked if the mother met her boyfriend online and the mother answered, "Yes." The escrow administrator asked if she had ever met the boyfriend face–to–face and she responded, "No." She was supposed to send the money to him so he could come to the U.S. so they could be married.

The escrow administrator told her and her daughter the $80,879 was diverted illegally from the sale of someone's property in Houston. They both gasped! The escrow administrator asked that they go directly to the bank and return the funds to the sending bank. They hung up and went to the bank and returned the wire transfer.

 

 
 

MORAL OF THE STORY

Settlement agents should never send a wire transfer based on instructions received via email. Email communication is not secure. Sending an email is like sending a postcard. Everyone who touches the postcard can read it, and the postcard you get might not be what was initially mailed. The same goes for email messages, except the number of people who can read the message is multiplied by millions.

Settlement agents should never wire transfer proceeds to a party unrelated to the transaction. They should only pay proceeds to the seller/owner of record and no one else. Payments to unrelated parties has long been a tell–tale sign of fraud.

In addition, you must ensure any emailed wire instructions are validated verbally through a trusted telephone number directly with the payee.

 
 

 

 
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